In the matter of M/S V-Guard Industries Ltd v. The Registrar of Trademarks & Anr. [C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 39/2022], Single Judge [C. HARI SHANKAR, J.] of the High Court of Delhi, via judgment dated January 06, 2023, allowed the appeal against an order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks on August 30, 2018, declaring the opposition filed by the Opponent (Appellant) as abandoned on the ground of delay in filing of evidence in support of opposition. The Single Judge interpreted the term ‘leave with the Registrar’ provided under Rule 45 (1) of Trade Mark Rules, 2017 in a broad connotation by observing that the procedural provisions cannot be interpreted so rigidly that they eviscerate the rights of the citizens and directed the Registrar (Respondent) to take on record, the evidence filed by the Appellant via courier.

Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 provides that – “Within two months from service of a copy of the counterstatement, the opponent shall…leave with the Registrar, such evidence by way of affidavit as he may desire to adduce in support of his opposition…”. However, the expression “leave with the Registrar” is nebulous and the question that arises is what would be considered as “left with the Registrar”

In the present case, the Appellant’s attempts to upload its Evidence within the original deadline were unsuccessful due to the Respondent’s website being non-functional. However, the Appellant sent its Evidence to the office of the Respondent via courier the very next day. The courier containing the Appellant’s evidence was received by the Respondent 3 days beyond the original deadline and subsequently, the Respondent had deemed the Opposition as abandoned. The Appellant stated that the delay was the result of a technical issue with the Respondent’s website, because of which the documents were sent to the office of the Respondent by courier the next day. 

The court set aside the impugned order passed by the Respondent abandoning the Opposition and observed that the term ‘leave with the Registrar’ should be interpreted in a broad connotation and stated that “What Rule 45(1) requires is that the evidence must be “left with the Registrar”. Where the statute is ambiguous, the benefit of ambiguity has to go to the citizen. This would be especially so where the statute confers a valuable commercial right on the citizen. It cannot be gainsaid that, having submitted the notice of opposition…the tendering of evidence in support of the opposition was a valuable commercial right which enured in favor of the opponent/appellant.”

Disclaimer: Views, opinions, interpretations are solely those of the author, not of the firm (ALG India Law Offices LLP) nor reflective thereof. Author submissions are not checked for plagiarism or any other aspect before being posted.

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In the matter of Vivek Purwar and Ors. v. Hari Ram and Sons, [RFA-IPD 4/2022, RFA-IPD 5/2022 and CM 96-99/2022], a Single Judge [Navin Chawla, J.] of the Delhi High Court, vide judgment dated November 2, 2022, held that merely because a party to the suit, in the course of their business, has issued advertisements, which may have a spill over circulation within its jurisdiction, would not vest the Court with the requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit of trade mark infringement and passing off.

Section 134 (2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 states that “…a “District Court having jurisdiction” shall… include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or, where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.” The question that therefore arises is whether spill over advertisement of a mark within the local limits of a court constitutes ‘carrying on business’ for conferring jurisdiction upon a Court.

The present suit is a cross-appeal challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Tiz Hazari Courts, Delhi to entertain and try the suit. The Appellant-Defendant contended that the learned Trial Court proceeded to pass a decree in favour of the Respondent-Plaintiff when the learned Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction try the suit. The Respondent-Plaintiff contended that solicitation of a business is an important part of the cause of action as this expresses an intention to use the mark in Delhi, and therefore doing so, within the territorial limits of Delhi, would confer jurisdiction in Delhi. The Appellant-Defendant submitted that its trademarks were advertised in print and electronic media vide newspapers and television channels that targeted only viewers in Uttar Pradesh, and therefore cause of action does not arise within the jurisdiction of Delhi.

The Court observed that “such an advertisement cannot vest jurisdiction in a Court located at Delhi, as the said advertisements were not intended for the customers at Delhi”.  The Court held that spill-over advertisement appearing in print and electronic media by itself would not confer any jurisdiction on the Court, since the parties are admittedly carrying on their business only within the State of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, the Court set aside the decree passed by the learned Trial Court.

Disclaimer: Views, opinions, interpretations are solely those of the author, not of the firm (ALG India Law Offices LLP) nor reflective thereof. Author submissions are not checked for plagiarism or any other aspect before being posted.

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In the matter of Milaap Social Ventures Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. V. Google India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. [W.P. (C) No. 6220/2022, the Single Judge [Sachin Shankar Magadum, J.] of the High Court of Karnataka, by decision dated November 23, 2022, set aside the order passed by the Trial Court and held that the Petitioner is entitled to amend the plaint to incorporate a prayer of relief against trademark infringement in a suit for passing-off.

Order 6 Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’) provides, “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and …shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy…”. The question is whether the prayer in a plaint be amended to seek an additional relief if the facts surrounding the cause of action remain the same.  

The Petitioner had sought a perpetual injunction against the Respondents from passing off the Petitioner’s trademark ‘MILAAP’ as a keyword to divert traffic to the Respondent’s website. During the pendency of the suit, the Petitioner’s mark ‘MILAAP’ was registered. Consequently, the Petitioner filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC to amend the plaint to include trademark infringement against the Respondents in the prayer. However, the Trial Court had rejected the application on the ground that the subsequent event of registration would give rise to a new cause of action, and that it would cause serious prejudice to the Respondents.

In the present petition against the Trial Court’s order, the Petitioner argued that the decision of the Trial Court to reject the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC solely on the basis that the Plaintiff can file a separate suit is patently erroneous, as the ground on which the suit is based would remain the same. The Respondents contended that the Petitioner cannot subsequently convert a suit filed under common law remedy to a statutory suit under the Trade Marks Act.

The High Court rejected the Respondents’ contention and held that “If the cause of action for infringement and passing off actions are substantially identical and same in law and both the reliefs are virtually based on the same fundamental idea, and if plaintiffs intend to incorporate the relief relating to infringement of trademark, that would not fundamentally change the character of the suit and it would only be in the nature of alternative relief.”

Disclaimer: Views, opinions, interpretations are solely those of the author, not of the firm (ALG India Law Offices LLP) nor reflective thereof. Author submissions are not checked for plagiarism or any other aspect before being posted.

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In the matter of Excitel Private Limited v. The Registrar of Trade Marks [C.A. (COMM. IPD-TM) 5/2021], Single Judge [Pratibha M. Singh, J.] of the High Court of Delhi, by decision dated July 18, 2022 allowed the appeal against an order passed by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks on October 28, 2020, refusing the application for the mark ‘REELTIME’ in Class 42 on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to render acquired distinctiveness to the mark. The High Court held that internet website extracts submitted by way of an Affidavit accompanied with a Certificate as prescribed under Section 65B (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would suffice as primary evidence in trademark proceedings.

Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that – “Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court”. The question would be whether printouts of internet websites would qualify as documents produced for inspection in trademark proceedings and if the same would be admissible as primary evidence.

The Appellant submitted proof of continuous and extensive usage of the mark “REELTIME” by way of an Affidavit arguing that the use of “REELTIME” on the Internet has been sufficiently placed on record along with printed extracts from the website. The Respondent in the impugned order dismissed the evidentiary value of the evidence submitted and stated that internet website extracts would not be primary evidence and would have merely secondary evidentiary value. Thus, having no primary evidence of acquired secondary meaning or concurrent use, internet extracts would not sufficiently prove long and continuous commercial use of the mark. The Respondent also submitted that the product under REELTIME is no longer being offered and hence, the rights in the said mark cannot be claimed by the Appellant despite having internet presence.

The Court held that, “rejecting the evidence extracted hereinabove, on the ground that it does not constitute primary evidence would be an incorrect approach…if there is any doubt…the examiner can call for an affidavit under Section 65B of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Simply rejecting the website printouts would be contrary to law as the law permits reliance on website printouts, so long as they can be they can be accompanied with a certificate under Section 65B of the IT Act.”

Disclaimer: Views, opinions, interpretations are solely those of the author, not of the firm (ALG India Law Offices LLP) nor reflective thereof. Author submissions are not checked for plagiarism or any other aspect before being posted.

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In the matter of Suryansh Broadcasting Pvt Ltd & Anr. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd & Anr. [FAO No. 9 of 2022], the High Court of Kerala vide judgement dated March 29, 2022, while dismissing the appeal filed by the Appellants against the Trial Court’s order refusing injunction against the telecast and airing of the Respontens’ programme, held that there is no copyright over a general theme/plot or its natural sequences.

Section 14(a)(vi) of the Copyright Act, 1957, provides that “copyright means the exclusive right to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts- (a)in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, – …(vi) to make any adaptation of the work.” The question that arises, therefore, is whether adopting a programme with a similar theme/plot will amount to an ‘adaptation’ of the original work?

The Appellants alleged that the Respondents made an adaptation of their programme since Respondents’ programme closely resembles their programme and even the actors employed are the same. The Appellants argued that the Respondents’ programme creates a reasonable doubt as to the identity in the minds of the viewers, who might believe that it is Appellants’ media.

The Court observed that there is no verbatim reproduction or adaptation of the Appellants’ programme in the Respondents’ programme. The theme employed is the spontaneous behaviour of the family members, in two identical families- one Hindu and the other Christian, which by itself does not bring the matter within the sweep of making an adaptation under Section 14(a)(vi).

The High Court while upholding the Trial Court’s order held that “Copyright is actually intended to protect the work of a particular person or group of persons or a firm whatever it may be, but that does not mean that it is not permissible to adopt the very same theme or plot or idea or subject matter by others unless the same is having an individual nature of its own with the employment of an invention made by the creator apart from the generality of idea, theme or plot and its natural sequences…mere similarities will not come under the purview of copyright as made mentioned in Section 14 of the Copyright Act, unless it satisfies the various clauses incorporated therein.”

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